The role of EU Special Representatives
in the post-Lisbon foreign policy system:
A renaissance? IES Policy Brief Issue 2012/02/June 2012 by Tolksdorf, Dominik
Policy  brief
The role of EU Special Representatives 
in the post-Lisbon foreign policy sys-
tem: A renaissance?
by Dominik Tolksdorf
The Lisbon Treaty has brought some major changes to the 
conduct of EU foreign policy most especially with the crea-
tion of the double-hatted post of High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-Presi-
dent of the European Commission (HR/VP), in the person of 
Baroness Catherine Ashton and the European External Ac-
tion Service (EEAS). While important foreign policy fields like 
neighbourhood and development policies continue to be ad-
ministered by the European Commission, some of the Com-
mission’s departments plus former parts of the Council Se-
cretariat – particularly those dealing with crisis management 
policies – were merged to create the new EEAS. However, the 
European Union Special Representatives (EUSRs) do not form 
part of the EEAS hierarchy. They have been at the disposal 
of the Council since 1996, and, since 1999, have operated 
under the responsibility of the then Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) High Representative, Javier Solana. 
Initial scepticism about the EUSRs by Catherine Ashton, So-
lana’s successor, have diminished in the last two years. With 
the present crisis in Syria, and continuing unrest in many 
other countries in the Arab world, it is likely that further 
EUSRs will be appointed in the coming months. Although 
their diplomatic work could be managed by the EEAS, this 
IES Policy Brief argues that due to their autonomy from both 
the EEAS and the European Parliament, some Member States 
consider the EUSRs as a flexible foreign policy instrument 
that operates beyond the existing institutional hierarchies 
of EU foreign policy. Consequently however, this means that 
the potential increases for ‘clashes of competence’ between 
the EUSRs and other EU actors such as the EEAS. This in turn 
EU Special Representatives have been deployed since 1996 in order to con-
tribute to the EU’s crisis management ef-
forts in various crisis regions. As they are 
not part of the formal hierarchy of the Eu-
ropean External Action Service and thus a 
rather flexible foreign policy instrument 
at the disposal of the Member States, 
new special representatives have been 
appointed in 2011 and 2012. This Policy 
Brief argues that the representatives’ 
autonomy must not necessarily lead to 
‘clashes of competence’ with the EU’s dip-
lomatic service.
Summary
may prompt incoherence and inconsistencies in the EU’s 
crisis management efforts.
The special representatives’ role and mandates
As one of the oldest CFSP instruments, the EUSRs are ap-
pointed by the Council of Foreign Ministers for a variety of 
mandate areas ranging from single countries to regions. 
As of June 2012, the ten EUSRs are to be found working in 
Afghanistan, the African Union, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Central Asia, the Horn of Africa, Kosovo, the Middle East 
peace process, the South Caucasus and the crisis in Geor-
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gia, the Southern Mediterranean region as well as Sudan 
and South Sudan. The point of the EUSRs is to represent 
the EU in those “crisis areas” in which the EU is willing 
to play a role as an international actor. They do this by 
obtaining and analysing information on the various con-
flicts, in order to contribute to developing a common EU 
policy towards the mandate area, and to better contribute 
to international mediation efforts in areas like the Sudan 
or Georgia. This often requires close coordination with 
other diplomats, including special representatives of in-
ternational organizations from the UN, OSCE, NATO and 
other regional organizations. After the EU had deployed 
its first missions in the framework of the Common Secu-
rity and Defence Policy (CSDP), starting with the European 
Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2003, 
the EUSRs quickly became relevant for the coordination 
of EU actors “on the ground”, to which they also give lo-
cal political guidance. While most of the EUSRs are based 
in Brussels, those EUSRs in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Her-
zegovina and Kosovo are now resident in the mandate 
areas and have gradually been “doubled hatted” as both 
acting EUSR and head of the relevant EU Delegation, the 
former European Commission Delegations. Similar to the 
selection of other high-ranking positions in the EU, the 
nomination of EUSRs is frequently akin to horse-trading 
between Member States. Given that mandate areas are 
themselves a politically sensitive issue in which the Coun-
cil has to strike a balance between the Member States’ 
diverging interests in regions outside of the EU, both the 
choice and deployment of EUSRs is no easy task.
Whereas prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the Council could ap-
point a EUSR whenever deemed necessary, in the post-
Lisbon era, the HR/VP now has the sole competence to 
propose a EUSR to carry out the EU mandate under the 
direct authority of the HR/VP. Although the number of 
EUSRs was originally to be reduced, and their tasks gra-
dually taken over by the EEAS, fast-moving developments 
in North Africa in 2010-2011 prompted the Council to 
appoint a variety of new EUSRs. Thus, in response to the 
“Arab Spring”, the foreign ministers in July 2011 appoin-
ted a EUSR for the Southern Mediterranean region. Being 
concerned about the humanitarian crisis affecting several 
countries in the Horn of Africa, another EUSR was appoin-
ted for the region in December 2011. Finally, a new EUSR 
was appointed in February 2012 to represent the EU in 
the Middle East peace process. Further nominations may 
follow, e.g. the appointment of an EUSR for the ongoing 
crisis in Syria.
The special representatives’ relations with the EU in-
stitutions: Potential for conflicts of competence?
The new appointments were influenced by a variety of 
practicalities. First, when the Lisbon Treaty entered into 
force, it was generally assumed that the EEAS would em-
ploy a much higher number of staff than is the case to-
day. As a result, the action service is hardly able to cover 
all policy areas that were originally envisaged for it. In 
addition, the managing directors who were to take over 
various tasks from the EUSRs appeared overloaded with 
other responsibilities, with little time to travel to, and 
competently assess areas of conflict. Catherine Ashton 
and senior EEAS officials therefore seem in favour of retai-
ning the EUSRs at least for a transitional period. Second, 
while the EEAS’ (administrative) budget is part of the EU 
budget, supervised by the European Parliament (EP), all 
administrative and operational expenditures resulting 
from EUSR activities are financed by the CFSP chapter of 
the EU budget. The management of these funds which 
are administered by the European Commission’s Foreign 
Policy Instruments Service, is more flexible than the admi-
nistration of funds of the normal EU budget. This perhaps 
explains why the Member States have become increasin-
gly interested in retaining the EUSRs as a rather flexible 
policy tool.
By not being funded out of the same budget, the EUSRs 
are not part of the direct hierarchy of the EEAS, and are 
therefore internally considered as “free electrons” within 
the system. An interesting issue that could become criti-
cal at some point is the relationship between the EUSRs 
and those EEAS departments who work on similar issues. 
Clearly decent cooperation will depend on informal con-
tacts between the EUSRs and EEAS officials like the ma-
naging directors, the members of the Corporate Board 
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and of Catherine Ashton’s cabinet. In addition, as a result 
of a lack of funds and personnel, the EEAS staff might be 
tempted in the future to “integrate” members of the EUSR 
teams who are based in Brussels – and often in the same 
building – into their daily work. However, financial regula-
tions stipulate that EUSR staff should not do the work of 
the EEAS personnel. While the EUSR teams and the EEAS 
units are supposed to closely coordinate their work, there 
are specific rules that need to be kept in mind regarding 
in their cooperation. As EU officials have argued, although 
the EEAS staff would at times be irritated with regard to the 
level of independence of EUSRs, the cooperation has thus 
far worked well. 
A second “coordination challenge” in the post-Lisbon tran-
sition phase is the relationship between the EUSRs and the 
EU Delegations. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the EUSRs were 
to contribute to – often highly political – issues like conflict 
resolution, whereas the European Commission Delegations 
were mainly responsible for the funding and implemen-
tation of EU projects in the field. This division of labour 
may gradually change due to the fact that EU Delegations 
are now to become more involved in political affairs. As 
an example, the Delegations are gradually taking over the 
functions of the local EU Presidency, i.e. to speak within 
a given third state on behalf of the EU as a whole, and to 
coordinate a common position among the Member States’ 
embassies. 
Despite the creation of the EEAS, the European Commission 
is still responsible for the implementation of many EU ex-
ternal policies. As those are often interlinked with key CFSP 
issues, the Commission and the EEAS are in many respects 
dependent on each other. As a result, Catherine Ashton has 
to coordinate her work with respective Commissioners in 
the College of Commissioners. However, when administe-
ring the external relations funds, many Commission units 
are supposed to follow the policy lines of the EEAS. Due to 
their budgetary provisions, the EUSRs can hardly work ef-
fectively without closely cooperating with the Commission, 
which can reinforce and tangibly support their diplomatic 
work through financial aid. The EUSRs also have to take the 
positions of the Parliament into account. In the past, the 
EUSRs have been criticised by MEPs, highlighting problems 
over democratic accountability in their work. However, with 
more regular participation of EUSRs in parliamentary hea-
rings over the last years, the relationship between the EP 
and the EUSRs has improved. Although only an informal 
practice, the EUSRs now have to present themselves to the 
EP’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) before taking up 
their posts, and to regularly brief the Parliament on their 
actions.
Options
In sum, whereas it initially seemed that the EUSRs might 
become an obsolete instrument in the EU’s foreign policy 
system, there has now been something of a ‘renaissance’ 
in their appointments to key mandate areas in the world 
in the last year. However, administrative conflicts may still 
arise from their unclear position within the EU foreign po-
licy system. This in turn could have detrimental effects on 
the EU’s crisis management efforts. To alleviate conflict, 
the following three policy suggestions are ventured:
1. EUSR teams and the EEAS staff should ensure proper 
coordination, for example by establishing informal coor-
dination procedures in which all EEAS, EC and EUSR team 
members working on similar issues meet regularly and 
coordinate their activities. This would contribute to the 
EUSRs’ effectiveness, which is also of value to the EEAS. 
Similarly, regular meetings between the EUSR teams 
and the EU Delegations working on the same region 
should be established to ensure proper coordination. 
 
2. The Member States should not regard the EUSRs as 
an instrument by which to side-line the work of the 
EEAS. It can be argued that the appointments of the 
new EUSRs in 2011 and 2012 were not only driven 
by budgetary considerations, but were very much an 
attempt by Member States to retain sufficient con-
trol over the content and orientation of the CFSP. In 
practice, the Member States’ control over the EUSRs 
may lead to outright competition between the EUSRs, 
EU Delegations, and powerful units within the EEAS. 
As this would contravene the initial philosophy of the 
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EEAS’ establishment – the creation of a more integra-
ted and coherent EU foreign policy – such a situation 
should be prevented by any means. Member States 
should therefore endeavour to demonstrate a genui-
ne interest in strengthening the EEAS, by instructing 
EUSRs to cooperate as closely as possible with the 
new service. On the other hand, in order to accommo-
date the member states, the EEAS officials should res-
pect the autonomy of the EUSRs to a certain extent. 
3. EUSRs should themselves seek close coordination 
with the relevant departments within the Commissi-
on, without which they will not succeed in their daily 
work. In addition, they should retain good relations 
with the Parliament, for example by regularly provi-
ding it with transparent information on their activi-
ties, and thus ensuring the EP’s support. 
Selected references
Adebahr, Cornelius (2009). Learning and Change in Euro-
pean Foreign Policy: The Case of the EU Special Represen-
tatives. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Council of the European (2010). Council Decision Establi-
shing the Organisation and Functioning of the European 
External Action Service. Doc. 11665/1/10, Brussels, 20 
July 2010.
Grevi, Giovanni (2007). Pioneering Foreign Policy: The EU 
Special Representatives. Paris: European Union Institute 
for Security Studies.
Raube, Kolja (2011). The Emerging Relationship Between 
the European Parliament, the High Representative and 
the External Action Service. Leuven: Leuven Centre for 
Global Governance Studies.
Policy   brief • n° 2012/02
